Based on their official statements, strikes on air defences continued throughout the war at a slower pace, suggesting that the Azeris were satisfied with the initial results. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin argument in 1932, The drone will always get through? The terrain over most of the theater is devoid of tall vegetation or other options of concealment.

The Azeris observed it with a drone from a safe distance till it folded its antenna and drove into a garage for maintenance or rest. One potential explanation for this limited use is the small missile inventories possessed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both countries inherited small inventories of ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union, and each has supplemented that arsenal with more modern missiles. In an age of highly proliferated sensors and shooters, militaries will need to consider new ways to camouflage and harden their forces.

Table 2: Azerbaijans Missiles, Drones, and Rocket Artillery, Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan. However, beyond the technical aspects of the drones themselves, there are tactical and professional aspects on the Azeri side that may have prevented them from fully exploiting drone capabilities and technical, tactical, and professional aspects on the Armenian side[iii] that may have assisted the Azeris in achieving more than they would have against a better-prepared foe.

In Syria and Libya, the drones attacked in a permissive environment regarding anti-drone defences. Copyright 2014 - 2022.Middle East Eye. Armenias missile arsenal is comprised entirely of Russian rockets. The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. [xviii] " Armenia: General accused Prime Minister Pashinyan of blunders in the war in Karabakh" (Russian), BBC News Russian, 19 November 2020, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-55005875. 'Azerbaijan even didnt need to change the actual shape of the Antonovs, they just need to appear as military drones on the radar'. The numbers declared accumulated gradually to 61 air defence targets on 7th October (Day ten of the war), but then, on 9th October, they reduced the accumulated total to only 27 and gradually added more until Aliyevs final statement of 73 items all together. As far as the destroyed trucks and most other soft skinned-vehicles are concerned, it is likely to be almost all of them, given the locations they were destroyed some distance from the front lines. Syrian regime forces were initially surprised and shocked as they had no air defence assets facing a Rebel force devoid of aircraft.

Major powers like the United States, China, and Russia are in the process of developing and deploying their own drone countermeasures, including kinetic interceptors, electronic jammers, and even counter-drone drones. The agreement, which was met with anger and disbelief among Armenians, handedadministrative control over several areas of the mountainous territory to Azerbaijan. The use of remotely piloted or autonomous aircraft, from now on called drones, has increased dramatically over the past two decades and has generated a debate on whether they are merely one more tool of war or a revolution in warfare. They enabled Azerbaijani forces to find, fix, track, and kill targets with precise strikes far beyond the front lines. Azerbaijan likewise invested heavily in rocket artillery. An important question is why did the Armenians not acquire better systems this war was not the first time they had faced drone strikes launched by the Azeris. For states like Azerbaijan, unable to fund and maintain an air force, though it had a smaller weaker air force, this was a radical enhancement in military capability. In the recent conflict, Azerbaijan also reportedly modified its Soviet-era An-2 Colt biplanes with remote-control systems, flying them to the front lines to draw out Armenian air defenses. [xvii] After the war, an Armenian general stated that the Armenians had successfully used a Russian electronic warfare system for several days. Also, the concept of spreading out against small guided steep trajectory munitions is almost irrelevant unlike statistical or flat-trajectory munitions, the miss, if it occurs will be very close to the target, and the warheads are fairly small.

Ground force tactics on dispersal and deception ought to be reinvigorated. The Azeris deny anything close to these numbers but provide no real numbers or evidence of their own. The current author has considered and corrected a couple of small errors. In fact, most of the drones today can carry munitions equivalent only to attack-helicopters. [ii] The Azeris do not admit this but comparing their statements at different times reveals their inaccuracy. Q2: Why didnt Armenia or Azerbaijan use more longer-range missiles? What is clear is that even if the Armenians did shoot down 264 drones, the Azeris apparently had many more available enough to achieve the results described above. [xix] See for example the shooting-down of an American surveillance drone by Iranian air defences in summer 2019.

However, it is just as clear that the drones did not win the war by themselves and did not make the ground battle easy. TB2s flew too high for these systems to intercept even if they were able to detect these relatively small aircraft. Whenever a bigger bomb is needed manned aircraft are still needed to carry them.

Baku then began to employ Soviet-era Antonov An-2 single-engine utility and agricultural aircraft, which cost nomore than $100,000 and were readily available. In contrast to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have relied on a steady stream of Iranian support to maintain a long ballistic missile war against Saudi Arabia, both Azerbaijan and Armenia seemed to want to conserve their limited munition stockpiles at the outset of hostilities. [xiii] Or, at least enough of them to ultimately make the defensive futile? Their penetration of Nagorno-Karabakhs deep rear also weakened Armenian supply lines and logistics, facilitating later Azerbaijani success in battle. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. An alternative explanation is that the Azeris had used their suicide-drones sparingly, so the Armenians were lulled into complacency by their presumed success in defeating this weapon. This debate escalated during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, but most articles simply stated opinions without providing actual data to support them.

One weakness of the remotely piloted drone is the threat that the enemy might override the controls and force it to crash by jamming or spoofing the signals sent by its pilot.

Azerbaijan used a LORA short-range ballistic missile in a more tactical role on October 2 to target a bridge connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. It comes not from the tactical capabilities of the drones, but from their cheapness, simplicity and availability compared to manned aircraft. Both sides may have determined that attacks on cities or vital infrastructure may invite escalation beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Q1: What missiles, drones, and rockets do Armenia and Azerbaijan have? Except the Tor, all were older less capable versions. Perhaps the proven destructions by drones are fewer than the total destroyed by drones, and perhaps the number of photographically proven drone-destructions is virtually all there were. Adding the other types of soft-vehicles struck and taking into account that even without photographic evidence, the location of most of the trucks and vehicles when destroyed or damaged was in areas that strongly suggest they too were hit by drones or other aircraft, changes the proportions but still does not necessarily change the order of priority the Azeris apparently ascribed to the different target types. After the war, President Aliyev published a summary of Armenian equipment destroyed and captured by the Azeris. Given the overall size of Nagorno-Karabakh and its mountainous terrain, 6 Tors were a drop in the bucket compared to the number needed to create a robust defence with overlapping fields-of-fire to provide cover for each other. This was their last statement on the subject though the war continued for another 39 hours. Photographic evidence collected by the Oryx team documents the destruction of 91 Azeri tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, another 26 damaged and a few more abandoned and captured by the Armenians. None of these sales included substantial quantities of missiles required for extended missile warfare.

Though again, one should be wary of statements over-hyping the effects there too. The use of UAVs and missiles to suppress and destroy air defenses gives greater validation to an observation of the U.S. Armys Air and Missile Defense 2028strategy: The most stressing threat is a complex, integrated attack incorporating multiple threat capabilities in a well-coordinated and synchronized attack.. Electronic warfare is useful but might accidentally bring down friendly drones, whereas interception weapons can be equipped to discern friendly from hostile drones. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict provides a small but important case study in the character of modern air and missile warfare.

However, exaggerated though the hype may be, the obvious lesson from all these events is that ground forces need to invest significantly in developing and procuring effective anti-small-drone equipment. Both are more accurate than the older Soviet missiles. Armenian ballistic missile strikes in Ganja, which is outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, would seem to be an outlier in this regard, though. Also, the Azeris have not released total figures for wounded only that on 3 December 2020, three weeks after the war ended and about 10 weeks from its beginning, 1,245 soldiers were still in medical institutions (Azerbaijan Ministry of Defence Statement, 3 December 2020). [ix] Official statement by the Armenian Ministry of Defence, 15:00, 8 November, 2020. The lessons here are not new. A desire to contain the conflict could explain the hesitancy to use longer-range ballistic missiles. [i] Uzi Rubin, The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: A Milestone in Military Affairs, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, December 2020, https://besacenter.org/nagorno-karabakh-war-milestone/, pp 4, 5. Achieving air-superiority in one fell swoop as in 1967 is no longer an option. The Turkish TRG-300 and Belarusian Polonez MLRS systems stand out with their ability to range targets up to 120 and 200 km away, respectively.

And then Israeli-built Harop loitering munitions, dubbed'kamikaze drones', would hit the Russian-made systems.. Do the available numbers support statements such as this? This should not be inferred from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Drones of Russian, Turkish, Israeli, and indigenous designs performed both reconnaissance missions to support artillery use and strike missions. ", Tango Six, 20 Oktober 2020, https://tangosix.rs/2020/20/10/analiza-okrsaji-azerbejdzanskih-dronova-i-sistema-pvo-jermenije-koje-su-lekcije-za-srbiju/ Yet while drones played a large role in this conflict, their capabilities ought not be exaggerated. We use cookies to optimize our website and our service. [xii] Official statement by the Armenian Ministry of Defence, 15:00, 8 November, 2020. In particular, strikes on air defense units constrained Armenias ability to counter Bakus UAVs, amplifying their effectiveness. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition attacks were able to destroy heavy ground units, including T-72 tanks and advanced S-300 air defenses. Some of the captured items were damaged and some were abandoned undamaged, but there is no account separating the two. Open-source reporting suggests that drones contributed to disabling a huge number of Armenian tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery units, and air defenses. Systems optimized to confront manned-aircraft are usually not sufficient to confront the smaller drones though against larger drones they can be effective.[xix]. Reducing days on which there were no drone strikes (at least four such days, according to the Armenians). The total photographic sample covers nearly 60% of Aliyevs claim and 75% of the sample was destroyed by drones, i.e., almost 45% of the total claimed by Aliyev were definitely destroyed by drones. These platforms are very vulnerable to air defenses that are designed to counter themdefenses Armenia did not have in adequate numbers. Azerbaijan was able to exploit this gap with its large fleet of sophisticated drones. As numerousrecentreports have argued, these weapons were game-changing.

[xv] Apparently there were only 6 Tors. In any case, the following analysis must be treated with caution.

The effect of drones on the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh was a replication of events in Syria and Libya. They are generally recognized as less capable than Azerbaijans fleet of foreign UAVs. [xiii] "The bomber will always get through" in a speech to parliament about the futility of trying to defend against the strategic bombing of a country's civilian heartland. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region included the heavy use of missiles, drones, and rocket artillery. Only England and Wales jurisdiction apply in all legal matters.

Even assuming they are telling the truth, the locations of these villages shows they are all right on the front line, a bit to the right or a bit to the left of the previous location claimed to be liberated. However, apparently the Armenians believed they were protected. Also, as the war progressed, journalists visiting 'liberated' villages often found them still in Armenian hands.

So basing computations of the future capability of drones against air defences on the Nagorno-Karabakh war is misleading. The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes. A satellite image published by Russian media last October indicated that Azerbaijan had moved 50 An-2 biplane aircraft to Yevlakh airport, near the Azerbaijani city of Ganja. First and foremost, the casualties suffered by the Azeris, which is a minimum of 2,900 admitted killed and a few thousand wounded. [xi] There have been reports of Armenian troops and units deserting against fewer reports claiming the same on Azeri troops.

A2: Despite early concerns that fighting could escalate to the targeting of strategic infrastructure and civilian territories, both Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to have limited their use of larger, longer-range missiles. Many accounts of the war describe it as a one-sided, an Azeri drones versus Armenian ground forces event with Azeri ground forces figuratively riding on the backs of the drones to victory with a minimum of fighting by them.

Q4: What broader lessons can we learn from the air war? We see this timeandtime again with both sides operating out in the open, static or moving slowly; poorly camouflaged; and clumped in tight, massed formations. Furthermore, concealment prevents movement how would the Armenians have brought up reinforcements or conducted counter-attacks while hiding? Both Armenia and Azerbaijans short-range air defense (SHORAD) arsenals were limited in size and quality. [viii] Here too propaganda issues muddy the waters the Azeris deny, though multiple other sources attest to, the involvement of Syrian mercenaries, who apparently suffered 250 to 540 killed depending on the source. As soon as it was unable to defend itself, it was bombarded with a number of suicide drones. Trucks are about 28% of the photographic sample of drone-destroyed targets more than tanks and AFVs (22%) but less than artillery (38%).

The countrys oil and gas sales over the past two decades have enabled it to modernize its armed forces, including significant funding for missiles, drones, and rocket artillery. The conflict also provides yet another reminder about the importance of passive defense. Furthermore, though the gap can probably only be reduced, not fully closed as with the use of even smaller drones by the Islamic State and other organizations. Their statements were often proven inaccurate so should be used with caution this would suggest about 4,500 wounded. For this article, the difference does not matter. A4: The primary lesson from the air war over Nagorno-Karabakh is the importance of full-spectrum air defense. The only solution is to provide active interception of the drones and the munitions an interception dome of mobile weapons that can cover an area large enough for a ground forces company or battalion to maneuver in and can move with that unit to maintain that dome wherever it goes. The Azeris have not provided any numbers on their equipment losses and Armenian claims seem grossly exaggerated (784 tanks and other AFVs by morning of 8th November[ix]).

[iv] Stijn Mitzer, Joost Oliemans, Jakub Janovsky, 'Dan' & 'COIN', "The Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses on The Sides Of Armenia and Azerbaijan", ORYX, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html. Sometimes these are permanent and sometimes temporary. It should be remembered that not all these targets were hit by drones. There were 14 days in which the Azeris did not publish new drone-strike videos (though whether because they had none or chose not to is not known), and concentrating more strikes on particular days to fit the waxing and waning of the ground combat and the vagaries of official Azeri statements, does not suggest an overwhelming rate of destruction. However, after suffering many fewer casualties than claimed in press releases by the Turks, the Syrian recovered within 24 to 48 hours, halted the Rebel ground attack the Turkish drone-offensive was supporting and counter-attacked to retake all ground lost to the Rebels and more. The fighting, which began in late September, concluded on November 10 through a Moscow-brokered truce that resulted in the deployment of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers and significant Armenian territorial concessions. Image from Radio Free Europe at https://bit.ly/3FdxQt4 - Still released by Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry, October 1, UAV. Azerbaijan was the clear military victor, with both Russia and Turkey also benefiting politically from the wars outcome.

There is no way to provide other numbers, but the achievements of the Armenian drones and air force in general suggest that the Armenian claims are a gross exaggeration.

States and organizations who cannot afford a full-capability air force of manned-aircraft can now acquire a capability that may not be as comprehensive or as powerful as manned aircraft. One report claimed that 9 Azeri drones had been brought down in this manner when they flew too near a Russian army base in Armenia. [xviii], The lesson is clear armies must develop and procure large numbers of anti-drone capable systems. It can be said that this was the first postmodern conflict, in that it was the first in which unmanned-aircraft overwhelmed a conventional ground force, grinding it down to the point of impotence and paving the way for the Azeri ground forces to roll in and take possession of a strategic chokepoint.[i]. The video and imagery available online suggest that neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani forces had adequate resources or training on passive defense. Azerbaijans battle strategy was based on the use of advanced drone technology in the disputed mountainous territory, tactics thatwon Baku the 44-day war against Armenian forces.Yerevan suffered huge losses of Russian weaponry, including six S-300 systems, according to the Azerbaijan military. Azerbaijani engineers converted the aeroplanes into unmanned aerial vehicles by replacing the pilot with a kit that allows remote control. Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Ministry of Defence of Armenia. Armenias larger air defenses like the S-300 are not designed for counter-UAV missions and were targeted early in the conflict by Azerbaijani loitering munitions. [vii] P. H. Pukhov (Editor), Storm Over Caucasus (Russian), Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2021, p 49. The ballistic missiles used spanned generations, from older Soviet-era Scud and Tochka missiles to the newer and more advanced Iskander and the Israeli-made LORA (LOng Range Attack) missiles. Dr. Eado Hecht is a defense analyst focusing on the connection between military theories and doctrines and their implementation. And if so were drones necessary to achieve this result, or could it have been achieved by ordinary aircraft? Azerbaijans combination of drones and artillery effectively targeted Armenias high-value military assets, most notably in attacks on T-72 tanks and S-300 air defenses.

The quotes from this source are only an example of many similar claims. However, it should be remembered that manned aircraft have been operating like this for many years, even when the enemy ostensibly has some air defence capability see the Israeli air forces almost complete freedom of action since 1982. To quote Erwin Rommel, who faced manned-aircraft not drones: Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with same chances of success.[xx]. Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data. Not only were the Armenians lacking in numbers of relevant systems, but neither did they use those they had properly sending them alone rather than providing each other cover. By wars end, the Armenians claimed to have shot down a grand total of 264 drones, 25 combat aircraft and 16 helicopters,[xii] however, provided no evidence. Given this apparent failure to achieve the mission with a ballistic missile, its limited arsenal, and the alternative of cheaper rockets and drones, it is unsurprising that Azerbaijan opted to limit its use of ballistic missiles throughout the conflict. Perusing the photographic evidence of drone strikes suggests Azeri preferences in attacking targets: nearly twice as many artillery targets were struck than tanks and other AFVs. The Azeris did not command the air, but the ability of their drones to exploit a specific gap in the Armenian air defence, gave them freedom to use the air and gradually, as they destroyed more and more Armenian air defence assets, provided operational freedom to use manned-aircraft too. The vast majority of the strike videos released by the Azeri Ministry of Defence were filmed by the TB2s, but these include videos of suicide-drone strikes, so it is not quite clear how many of these videos show actual TB2 strikes or the TB2 is merely the spotter for the suicide-drone attack. Baku specifically used the LORA to strike a bridge connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh in an attempt to cut off Armenian reinforcements and supplies. The importance of both full-spectrum air defense and passive defenses have been shown in battles acrosstheMiddle East and in planning for potential conflict with Russia and China. Turkish-Armenian normalisation gathers pace as Ankara expects gradual success, The promise of wealth brings Iran and Azerbaijan together after Armenia tensions, EXCLUSIVE: Azerbaijan, Armenia 'near ceasefire deal' on Nagorno-Karabakh, Israeli defence system shot down Russian missile Armenia fired at Baku, Israeli 'kamikaze' drones wreak havoc in Nagorno-Karabakh. Given the available data, computing the exact share in victory between drones and ground forces more accurately than that is impossible. The Armenians claimed to have inflicted 7,630 casualties (Armenian Ministry of Defence Spokesperson, 8 November 2020) . This misrepresents events in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Syria. Azerbaijan even didnt need to change the actual shape of the Antonovs, they just need to appear as military drones on the radar.. In addition to providing identification and targeting data, the TB2s also carried smart, micro guided munitions to kill targets on their own. The version downloaded is updated to 25 October 2021. Middle East EyeISSN 2634-2456, The Azerbaijani military used decoy aircraft to lure out the air-defence systems deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh, An S-300 missile system at the rehearsals of Victory Day parade in Moscow in 2009 (Creative Common/Vitaly V Kuzmin), Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict: How Baku destroyed Russian S-300s with Israeli suicide drones. Only the Tor was a threat to the Bayraktar TB-2 and Israeli-made suicide-drones. Can Kasapoglu, director of defence research at Turkish think-tank EDAM, told MEE that the method was a textbook approach to the Russian weaponry. However, the strike videos they released showed much fewer air defence targets struck than declared so either the declarations were exaggerated, or the videos were only a chosen sample.

According to imagery after the strike, the attack failed to incapacitate the bridge, suggesting limits even to the most precise ballistic missiles. By contrast, Azerbaijan fields a more diverse and modern arsenal of missiles, rockets, and drones. Russian-supplied Polye-21 electronic warfare systems disrupted Azerbaijani drone operations but only for four days. [x] Official Azeri statements claimed successes on all these days with lists of Azeri villages abandoned in the previous war (1989 1994) were liberated. Turkey used its fleet of drones to lay waste to Syrian Arab Army (SAA) tanks, vehicles, and air defenses, while Azerbaijan was able to do much the same against Armenian forces in Nagorno Karabakh.[xxi]. The 44-day war featured a diverse array of legacy and advanced air and missile strike and defense platforms. If these numbers are true, then the Armenian air defence is definitely worthy of the adjective formidable as quoted above. Table 1: Armenias Missiles, Drones, and Rocket Artillery. Another issue is that whether using physical interceptors or electronic warfare, the defending unit continuously signals its own location and that of the unit it is defending to the enemys signals intelligence. Even assuming that this is the complete portion of targets destroyed by drones, this is certainly a sizeable proportion. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 in particular demonstrated the versatility of UAV platforms. For decades the Israeli army has been used to fighting without looking up to see whose aircraft was rumbling overhead, knowing with virtually 100% certainty it was Israeli. However, this gap was created by Armenian mistakes, not by the essential nature of drone warfare.

As with Armenia, however, the BM-30 Smerch appeared to be Azerbaijans rocket of choice.

To quote a typical example: Azerbaijans UAVs obliterated Armenias formidable array of ground-based air defences, after which they systematically decimated Armenias ground force matriel, including tanks, artillery pieces, and supply trucks.

Only England and Wales jurisdiction apply in all legal matters. [xvi] Ashot Hakobyan, "General Daniel Balayan: 'Azerbaijanis brought this fight upon themselves ",Aravot Armenia News, 21 July 2020, https://www.aravot-en.am/2020/07/21/260526/ Exact amounts of the various missile systems are not available, but they included a combination of Strela-10 (SA-13), Osa (SA-8), Kub (SA-6), Krug (SA-4), S-300 and Tor. It was only on November 9right before the peace agreement was signedthat footage emerged of an Armenian Iskander launch. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). The fact is that on the first days of the war repeated Azeri ground attacks failed to penetrate Armenian defences[x] and that even after they finally succeeded, exploiting this success faced stiff resistance and they suffered a few more tactical defeats before the final victory. One Tor was destroyed towards the end of the war. A senior official, who was briefed on Azerbaijans drone warfare, told MEE that at first Baku found it difficult to detect the S-300s,which were concealed and difficult to spot. The Antonovs would appear on radar as legitimate military-grade drones and activate the S-300 systems, the official said.

It is possible that in the last days of the war, more Armenians despaired so there was a greater inclination to retreat than to fight, but definitely during the first half of the war, the Armenians stood their ground and counter-attacked frequently and on the last days too there were fierce battles. In addition to the Tochka missiles it inherited from the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan purchased the Israeli LORA ballistic missile and EXTRA (EXTended Range Artillery) guided rocket. Azerbaijan also developed an impressive drone arsenal composed of Turkish and Israeli UAVs. A similar pattern can be seen also in regard to the variety of other targets attacked: publication of statements much higher than the video evidence; an accumulation of enemy targets destroyed reaching a peak at noon 9th October, and that evening a reduction in the accumulated claims (tanks and other AFVs from 275 to 232 and artillery systems from 286 to 242) and a much more gradual accumulation from then to the end of the war. A1: Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have invested in modernizing their militaries, including fielding more advanced air and missile systems.